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BUSINESS REGULATION
REGULATION OF RADIO BROADCASTING:
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE OR PUBLIC UTILITY?
The Federal Communications Commission, on May 2, 1941, issued an
order in Docket Number 5060, promulgating eight regulations designed to
alleviate certain monopolistic tendencies in radio broadcasting. These regu-
lations implemented the Commission's "Report on Chain Broadcasting" (the
product of two years' study), which was released two days later.
Although these regulations were to have become effective at the end of
July, 1941, their operation has been suspended indefinitely while broadcasters,
networks, and the Commission engage in one of the bitterest controversies
that has yet beset the Commission. From the Commission's chambers the
fight spread to the halls of Congress and is now in the process of adjudication
in the federal courts.1 Chairman Fly of the Commission opines that "the
new regulations might properly be called a Magna Carta for American broad-
casting stations" ;2 President Paley of the Columbia Broadcasting System
asserts that they are the "first paralyzing blow at freedom of the air in the
United States."3
And while this controversy continues, proposed legislation is before Con-
gress to overhaul the applicable provisions of the Communications Act of 1934,
under the alleged authority of which these regulations were promulgated. 4
This is the arena upon which this paper proposes to throw some light, its
aim being to present an analysis of the problems arising out of the situation
with which the Commission deals, and, upon the basis of that analysis, to
make a suggestion.
I. THE FAcrS
A. The Industry
There are at present 890-odd standard broadcast stations in the United
States.5 Approximately three-fourths of these are full-time stations. These
10n July 22, 1941, CBS and NBC petitioned the FCC to postpone the application of
the regulations to their contracts until September 16. On August 14, Mutual filed its
petition that the Commission amend certain of the regulations; and on August 28 the
Commission announced that the regulations would not become effective until after dis-
position of the Mutual petition. Pursuant to that petition the regulations were amended
slightly on October 11. At present there are pending suits by CBS and NBC against
the FCC for injunctions against putting the regulations into effect. Meanwhile, Senator
White, of the Interstate Commerce Committee of the Senate, introduced Senate Resolu-
tion 113, calling for a Senate investigation of the FCC's action, pending which the reg-
ulations were to be suspended. Hearings were held on this resolution, but no further
action has been taken by the Senate Committee. See Hearings before ComnnZittee oft
Interstate Commerce on S. Res. 113, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) (hereafter cited as:
Hearnqs on S. Res. 113).
2FCC Press Release 49854, May 4, 1941, p. 2.
3 See pamphlet issued by Mr. Paley, May 5, 1941, under that title, Columbia Broadcast-
ing System, New York.
4S. 1806, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), introduced July 31 (legislative day, July 28)
by Senator White, of Maine.
tiSource: unofficial press reports. The last official data lists 848 stations in operation
or under construction as of June 30, 1940. FCC, Sixth Annual Report (1941) 51.
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stations are divided into groups corresponding to the classification of broad-
casting channels available-cdear, regional, and local. Clear channel stations
are more powerful, and serve a wider area than the others. Regional stations
are more powerful than local and less powerful than clear channel stations,
and reach a correspondingly narrowed audience. Local stations render pri-
mary service to a city or town and contiguous areas.0
Only a limited number of stations can operate on the standard broadcast
band without creating mechanical interference which destroys satisfactory
reception. Stations are allocated on a geographical basis so as to provide all
sections of the country with adequate service. As a result of this policy and
the limitation of available channels, there are today 118 cities with populations
of more than 50,000 each in which there are only three or less full-time
commercial stations. Ninety-one of these cities have but two stations.' This
situation creates a "bottleneck" as to local station outlets for the national
networks.71
Broadcasting stations operate for profit, deriving their revenue from the
sale of "time." The rules of the FCC require that a certain percentage of
broadcasting time be devoted to sustaining programs consisting of educa-
tional, civic, or community interest material. The station operator, therefore,
must seek advertisers who will buy time, and must find sustaining programs
to fulfill the Commission's requirements of its licensees. Only to a limited
extent can the broadcaster find these essentials locally.
Out of this situation the network chains arose. Giants of the industry, their
primary function is that of national advertising agencies. Their secondary
function is the producing of programs, both sustaining and commercial.
Given a program on hand they sell it to an advertiser. But to sell a program,
they must "sell time" on stations broadcasting over channels that cover the
entire national market, or a desired regional market. To have that time to
sell, the networks enter into time option contracts or affiliation agreements
with the broadcasters. As part of the consideration for these contracts the
networks provide the stations with the necessary sustaining programs.
There are four national networks today. The Columbia Broadcasting
System owns 8 stations and has 122 affiliated stations.8 The National Broad-
casting Company formerly operated two national chains, the Red and the
Blue networks, at which time it owned 10 stations and listed 233 stations
affiliated with the two chains.9 On January 9, 1942, however, the Blue Net-
work Company was formed as a separate organization, although it, like NBC,
is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Radio Corporation of America. 10 This
reorganization, in anticipation of a sale of the network, was the result of
pressure brought by the Communications Commission upon NBC to dispose
of one of its two chains in compliance with the regulations discussed below.
It may be partially attributed also to an anti-trust action instituted by the
6FCC, Sixth Annual Report (1941) 48 et seq.
7See Hearings on S. Res. 113, pp. 220-223.7aSee page 264 infra.8See Hearings on S. Res. 113, p. 19; and see pamphlet, "What the New Radio Rules
Mean," Columbia Broadcasting Company, New York, May 17, 1941.9See Hearings on S. Res. 113, p. 465
'ON. Y. Times, January 15, 1942.
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Department of justice some ten days earlier. For practical purposes, how-
ever, there is not as yet an effective separation of the Red and Blue networks.
The Mutual Broadcasting System is owned by seven broadcasters; it lists
176 affiliates. 1 As of June, 1941, 503 of the nation's 848 broadcasting sta-
tions were affiliated with one of these networks.12
Two other ownership-control items should be mentioned. CBS, NBC,
and Mutual own all of the highest-powered clear channel stations.13 And
CBS and NBC, being first on the scene, have the more desirable metropolitan
stations affiliated with their chains, whereas 104 of Mutual's stations are low-
powered local stations in smaller cities.14
If these four networks freely bought the broadcasting time of the stations
and freely sold their services to the stations, the present problem might not
exist. The "bottleneck," and the resultant monopolistic restraint of trade,
arises from the affiliation contracts between the networks and the stations.
B. The Contracts
The affiliation contracts 15 in current use have two characteristics which
are condemned by the FCC: exclusivity and time option provisions.
The exclusivity provisions are bilateral. The network covenants not to
supply its services to any other station in its affiliate's territory; the affiliate
covenants not to broadcast the programs of any other network.' 6 In the
event that the affiliate rejects any program offered by the network the radio
audience of that locality is deprived of the benefit of that program.17 Although
these contracts expressly give the affiliate the power to reject any programs
offered by the network as not being "in the public interest," this power is
"See Hearings on S. Res. 113, pp. 156, 465.
12See id. at 465.
'
3 There are 30 such stations; CBS and NBC own all but two which are the majority
stockholders in Mutual. See id. at 24.
34 See id. at 167 et seq.
'
5 For examples of the type of contract used by each of the networks and condemned
by the FCC, see id. at 107-126.
16 See paragraph 8 of the CBS contract, id. at 113: "Columbia will continue the Station
as the exclusive Columbia outlet in the city in which the Station is located ... and will
not furnish its exclusive network programs to any other station in that city, except
in case of public emergency. The Station will operate as the exclusive Columbia outlet
in such city.. . and will not join for broadcasting purposes any other formally organized
or regularly constituted group of broadcasting stations." NBC's provision reads: "[Y]ou
agree not to permit the use of your, station's facilities by any radio network, other than
ours, with which is permanently or occasionally associated any station serving wholly or
partially a city or county of 1,000,000 or more inhabitants." See id. at 112. Mutual,
until 1940, used merely the following unilateral provision: "Mutual will not, during the
life of this contract, purchase time on any other station in, or within a radius of 50
miles of [the city] in the event that the station [named] is able to provide its facilities. ...
See id. at 115.17Two examples of this result of the exclusivity contracts were brought out before the
Senate Committee. Several areas were unable to hear broadcasts of the World Series
because CBS and NBC stations were not free to take the programs from Mutual. See id.
at 30, 173, 393-395. In the other instance, station WOR, located in Newark, rejected the
Mutual news commentary of Fulton Lewis, Jr. Although New York city has 15 full-time
commercial stations, several of which are unaffiliated with any network, WOR's rejection
deprived the large New York audience of Lewis' talks. See id. at 289-298.
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variously circumscribed in relation to commercially sponsored programs,1 8
and, perhaps, is virtually non-existent in most cases in view of the economic
relationship of the parties.19
Time options are provided to assure the network that it will have the
broadcasting time of the stations to sell to advertiser-sponsors. Although
variously drawn, these provisions give the network first call on a specified
amount of the stations' time. The options generally cover all the more desir-
able hours, and are exercisable by the network on 28 days' notice. Upon the
exercise of the option by the network, a station is obligated to clear the time
taken, by canceling or moving programs previously scheduled for that time.20
Another contract provision is on the condemned list. As used by the
National Broadcasting Company this provision is: "If you accept from
National advertisers net payments less than those which N.B.C. receives
for the sale of your station to network advertisers for corresponding periods
of time, then N.B.C. may, at its option, reduce the network rate for your
station in like proportion. ' 21 . This provision -obviously prevents competition
between affiliates and the network.22
These contracts run over a term of five years, with the network having
an option to cancel without cause on one year's notice.
23
C. The Regulations
Looking at this situation the Federal Communications Commission found
it not in the "public convenience, interest, or necessity" for station licensees
18NBC stipulates: "[B]ecause of your public responsibility your station may reject a
network program the broadcasting of which would not be in the public interest, con-
venience, and necessity." See id. at 109. But NBC also stipulates: "In the event you
substitute a program for a network program . . . you agree to pay us as liquidated
damages a sum equal to the amount by which the total monies you receive for broadcasting
the substituted program... exceeds the monies you would have received from us.... This
provision . . . shall not be deemed to give you the option to refuse to accept such a net-
work program by making the payments specified. . . ." See id. at 112. Columbia pro-
vides: "Either the Station or Columbia may on special occasions substitute for . . .
sponsored programs sustaining programs devoted to education, public service ... without
any obligation to make any payment .... In case the Station has reasonable objection to
any sponsored program or the product advertised thereon as not being in the public interest
the Station may on 3 weeks' prior notice thereof to Columbia, refuse to broadcast such
program ... ." See id. at 113.
19 See id. at 90-92.2 0Thus, the broadcaster cannot make a binding contract with local advertisers or civic
groups to broadcast non-network programs. Quaere if it is not as important that local
programs be broadcast efficiently as that national programs be so handled. See Kadetsky
and Kahn, Legal Problems of Radio Broadcasting Contracts (1940) Am L. REv. 154.
Associated problems are raised in Pierce v. Puget Sound Broadcasting Co., 170 Wash.
472, 16 P. (2d) 483 (1932), where an advertising agency was allowed to recover damages
for the station's breach of contract; Churchill Evangelistic Ass'n v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing Company, 142 Misc. 210, 255 N. Y. Supp. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1931), afflrmed, 236 App.
Div. 624, 260 N. Y. Supp. 451 (4th Dep't 1936).2 ISee Hearings on S. Res 113, p. 111.22 Note that this provision prevents the station from selling time at less than the rate
the network offers it for, while the provision quoted at note 18 supra prevents the station
from selling at a higher rate. The net result of these two provisions is to make the
network the rate-fixing agency for the stations in the national market.2 3 See Hearings on S. Res. 113, p. 89.
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to enter into these contracts. The bases of this determination are two in
number. First and most obvious is restraint of competition between chains.
Once three chains have an exclusive outlet in a three-station city, no other
network can compete with the first three in that city.24 Companion result of
this restraint is the fact that the listening public is deprived of the programs
thereby kept off the air. The other aspect of the situation incurring the
displeasure of the FCC is that of control of program content. The station
operator, in the opinion of the Commission, is deprived by the terms of the
affiliation contracts of the power to exercise discretion as to what he broad-
casts.
To correct the situation the Commission issued regulations providing (as
amended) for the non-issuance of a license to any station which has an
exclusivity contract with a network, 25 which affiliates with a network for
longer than two years,26 which grants a network more than a limited amount
of option time,27 which gives up the right to reject unsatisfactory network
programs,28 or which is not free to fix its own rates for sale of time other
24 This is in general the situation that faces Mutual throughout the country. It should
be remembered that networks sell to national advertisers, and if any one network cannot
acquire an outlet in certain parts of the so-called "national marketing area," it cannot
sell its programs at all, "When Mutual- can't sell Cleveland, it will frequently, almost
regularly, lose prospective national advertisers to, competing networks." Testimony of
Louis G. Caldwell, counsel for Mutual, before Senate Committee, Hearings oft S. Res. 113,
p. 160-161.2 5 The symbol "T" in the following regulations indicates the standardized introduction
to five of the eight regulations, which is as follows: "No license shall be granted to a
standard broadcast station having any contract, arrangement, or understanding, express
or implied, with a network organization" ....
Regulation 3.101. : under which the station is prevented or hindered from, or penalized
for, broadcasting the programs of any other network organization.
Regulation 3.102. : which prevents or. hinders another station serving substantially the
same area from broadcasting the network's programs not taken by the former station, or
which prevents or hinders another station serving a substantially different area from
broadcasting any program of the network organization. This regulation shall not be con-
strued to prohibit any contract, arrangement, or understanding between a station and a
network organization pursuant to which the station is granted the first call in its primary
service area upon the programs of the network organization.2
-Regulation 3.103. : which provides, by original term, provisions for renewal, or other-
wise for the affiliation of the station with the network organization for a period longer
than two years: Provided, That a contract, arrangement, or understanding for a period up
to two years, may be entered into within 120 days prior to the commencement of such
period.2 7Regulation 3.104. No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station which
options for network programs any time subject to call on less than 56 days' notice, or
more time than a total of three hours within each of four segments of the broadcasting
day, as herein described. The broadcast day is divided into 4 segments, as follows: 8 a.m.
to I p. m.; 1 p. m. to 6 p. m.; 6 p. m. to 11 p. m.; 11 p. m. to 8 a.m. Such options may
not be exclusive as against other network organizations and may not prevent or hinder
the station from optioning or selling any or all of the time covered by the option, or
other time, to other network organizations.2 8Regulation 3.105. : which (a), with respect to programs offered pursuant to an af-
filiation contract, prevents or hinders the station from rejecting or refusing network
programs which the station reasonably believes to be unsatisfactory or unsuitable; or
which (b), with respect to network programs so offered or already contracted for, pre-
vents the station from rejecting or refusing any program which, in its opinion, is contrary-
to the public interest, or from substituting a program of outstanding local or national
importance.
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than the network programs.29 Still other regulations are directed toward
cutting down the ownership control of the networks. The Commission an-
nounced that no license will be granted to a network for more than one
station covering substantially the same area, or in an area where to so license
a station would result in competition being substantially curtailed.30 No sta-
tion is to be licensed which is affiliated with a network organization which
maintains more than one network.3 1 This last regulation is directed toward
forcing a complete separation of the two NBC chains, which separation is
now in its preliminary stages. 2
Two members of the Commission dissented from the proposed regulations.
33
Only Mutual, among the networks, approves of them. No unanimity of
opinion as to their desirability was forthcoming from the members of the
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce. CBS and NBC have attacked
the regulations by means of a suit for an injunction, which was still undecided
at the time of wvriting.3 4
The immediate question raised is whether the Commission has the statutory
authority to promulgate the regulations. An underlying question of greater
importance is whether, assuming or provided the authority, these regulations
should be put into effect, as a matter of public policy.
II. AuTHORITY OF THE FCC
A. Background
There has never been any serious dissent from the proposition that the
process of radio broadcasting is interstate commerce. The courts have repeat-
edly so held.3 5 It follows that Congress has plenary power to regulate and
2 9Regulation 3. 108. T under which the station is prevented or hindered from, or pen-
alized for, fixing or altering its rates for the sale of broadcast time for other than the
network's programs.
SORegulation 3.106. No license shall be granted to a network organization, or to any
person directly or indirectly controlled by or under common control with a network
organization, for more than one standard broadcast station where one of the stations
covers substantially the service area of the other station, or for any standard broadcast
station in any locality where the existing standard broadcast stations are so few or of
such unequal desirability (in terms of coverage, power, frequency, or other related mat-
ters) that competition would be substantially restrained by such licensing.3 lRegulation 3.107. No license shall be issued to a standard broadcast station affiliated
with a network organization which maintains more than one network: Provided, That
this regulation shall not be applicable if such networks are not operated simultaneously,
or if there is no substantial overlap in the territory served by the group of stations com-
prising each such network.3 2See note 10, supra. Added to the regulations is a series of provisos intended to post-
pone the effective dates of those regulations requiring the disposition of properties until
arrangements for orderly disposition can be made.
33 Commissioners Case and Craven. See FCC Press Release 49881, May 4, 1941.3 4 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, et al., S. D. N. Y., Civil Action
No. 16-179; National Broadcasting Company, Inc., et als. v. United States, et a.,
S. D. N. Y., Civil Action No. 16-178.
3 5Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtge. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 53 Sup.
Ct 627 (1933) ; Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax Comm., 297 U. S. 650, 56 Sup. Ct.
608 (1936); General Electric Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 31 F. (2d) 630 (App. D. C.
1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 464, 50 Sup. Ct. 389 (1930). See generally McCain, The
Medium Through Which a Radio Wave is Transmitted as a Natural Channel of Interstate
[Vol. 27
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control radio broadcasting under the commerce clause of the Federal Con-
stitution.30
The question of jurisdiction, therefore, is purely a matter of statutory
interpretation: what jurisdiction did the Congress give the Commission?
The Federal Communications Commission was created by the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.37 Its creation was the culmination of twenty-two years of
experimentation in the field of radio regulation.38 The 'enacting statute vests
in the Commission the complete regulatory power delegated by Congress in
the prior acts.3 9
The purpose of the provisions relating to radio broadcasting is stated thus:
"It is the purpose of this chapter, among other things, to maintain
the control of the United States over all the channels of interstate and
foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels,
but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time,
under licenses granted by Federal authority .... 40
The Commission itself was established.
"so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service .... ,,4i
To effectuate these two purposes the Commission is empowered to license
broadcasting stations "from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or
necessity requires" ;42 but no license may be granted for a period longer than
three years,43 and "no such license shall be construed to create any right,
Commerce (1940) 11 Am L. Rv. 144; Fletcher, The Interstate Character of Radio
Broadcasting: An Opinion (1940) 11 Am L. Rav. 345. The latter article presents a
searching analysis of the question by the Chairman of the State Corporation Commission
of Virginia in an advisory opinion answering the question whether the Columbia Broad-
casting System should be fined for doing business in Virginia wthout a license as required
by the statute of that state. Finding that CBS was engaged solely in interstate commerce,
Chairman Fletcher concluded that it was not subject to the requirement of a license.
s0U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3748 STAT. 1064 et seq., 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1934).38The first effort to bring radio within the licensing power of the federal government
came in 1912. The Radio Act of 1912 (37 STAT. 302 et. seq.) gave the Secretary of Com-
merce a non-discretionary power to license broadcasters. The licenses were revocable for
cause, however. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F. (2d) 614 (N. D. Ill.
1926). The Radio Act of 1927 (44 STAT. 1162 et seq.) broadened the powers of the
regulatory body thereby created (Federal Radio Commission) and gave it the discretion-
ary power to license in the "public convenience, interest, or necessity." See In re Sheldon
Street Ry., 69 Conn. 626, 38 Atl. 362 (1897) for classic definition of the concept involved.3SUnder the Mann-Elkins Act [36 STAT. 536, 544 (1910)] and the Radio Act of 1927
(supra note 38), the ICC possessed power to regulate common carriers by radio, and
the FRC had control over various technical aspects of broadcasting, e.g., assignment of
frequencies, limitation of power, etc. These powers were transferred to the FCC in the
Act of 1934. See Sablosky v. United States 101 F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A, 3d 1938), in
which the jurisdictional limits of the Act are construed.
4048 STAT. 1214 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 301 (1934). Hereafter, citations to the Com-
munications Act of 1934 will be to the appropriate section of 47 U. S. C.
4147 U. S. C. § 151.
4247 U. S. C. § 303 and subsection(l) ; § 307.
4347 U. S. C. § 307 (d).
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beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license." 44
In granting these licenses the Commission has the power and is charged
with the duty "to prescribe the qualifications of station operators .. . and
to issue [licenses] to such citizens . . . as the Commission finds qualified. ' 45
Licenses are renewable, and in granting renewals the Commission is "limited
to and governed by the same considerations and practice which affect the
granting of original applications. '46 Finally, the Commission is empowered
generally to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the
public interest." 47
The rule-making power of the Commission is couched in broad "catch-all"
phraseology, to wit: "[The Commission shall] make such rules and regu-
lations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with
law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter....
Further, the Commission may "make special regulations applicable to radio
stations engaged in chain broadcasting." 49
In promulgating the chain broadcasting rules-regulations 3.101 to 3.108
-the Commission purported to exercise these rule making powers in relation
to its licensing power and its renewal power. In view of the provisions cited
above, the Commission appears to have acted within its jurisdiction if the
conditions imposed are reasonable qualifications to be imposed on an appli-
cant for a license, and if the regulations will serve "public convenience, in-
terest, or necessity." Under the doctrine of Federal Radio Commission v.
Nelson Brothers,5" the latter question in the circumstances here presented
probably would be decided in favor of the Commission, with the court re-
fusing to review the facts as found by the Commission. In the Nelson case
the Court said:
"In granting licenses the Commission is required to act 'as public con-
venience, interest, or necessity requires.' This criterion is not to be
interpreted as setting up a standard so indefinite as to confer an un-
limited power .... The requirement is to be interpreted by its context,
by the nature of radio transmission and reception, by the scope, char-
acter and quality of services .... r1
And again:
"In the light of the decision in the General Electric case, . . . the
Congress . . . amended § 16 of the Radio Act of 1927, so as to limit
the review by the Court of Appeals .... That review is now expressly
limited to 'questions of law' and it is provided 'that findings of fact
4447 U. S. C. § 301.
4547 U. S. C. § 303 (1).
4647 U. S. C. § 307 (d); cf. § 309.
4747 U. S. C. § 303 (g).
4847 U. S. C. § 303 (r) ; see also § 154 i).
4947 U. S. C. § 303 (i).50289 U. S. 266, 53 Sup. Ct. 627 (1933), 89 A. L. R. 406, 420, 42 YALz L. J. 1274. See
also Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 98 F. (2d) 288 (App. D. C. 1938), reversed,
309 U. S. 134, 60 Sup. Ct. 693 (1940). The lower court's decision is noted in (1940)
25 CORNELL L. Q. 271.
51289 U. S. at 285.
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by the commission, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be con-
clusive unless it shall clearly appear that the findings of the commission
are arbitrary or capricious.' . . . [A]n inquiry into the facts before the
Commission, in order to ascertain whether its findings are thus vitiated,
belongs to the judicial province. . . .Such an examination is not con-
cerned with the weight of evidence or with the wisdom or expediency
of the administrative action."'52
Some indication that this type of condition is reasonable is to be found in
other provisions of the Communications Act itself.. Thus a licensee is expressly
prohibited from transferring any rights accruing to him under the license
by Section 310 (b), unless the Commission consents to the transfer.53 If
the contract provisions outlawed by the chain broadcasting regulations do in
fact transfer any of the licensee's rights to the network, it is not unreasonable
for the Commission to rule that no renewal will be granted to any licensee
who so violates the provisions of Section 310 (b), even though other admin-
istrative remedies for violation of the Act are providedY4 This contention
finds further support in the fact that the provisions for revocation of licenses
expressly allow the Commission to consider past conduct, including "violation
of or failure to observe any of the restrictions and conditions of this chapter
or of any regulation of the Commission authorized by this chapter. .. .5
Although this provision applies to revocation and not to renewals, it seems
that these considerations would apply in renewal hearings by reasonable
implication, inasmuch as failure to renew seems to all intents and purposes
to necessitate the same findings as would justify a revocation, i.e., that con-
tinued operation is not in the "public convenience, interest, or necessity."
The Commission has in fact considered past operation and violations of the
Act as determinative factors in such hearings; and this action has met with
court approval.58
52289 U. S. at 275, 277. The provision for limited judicial review commented on by
the Court is retained without change in the Act of 1934. 47 U. S. C. § 402 (e). See
Warner, Subjective Judicial Review of the Federal Communications Commission (1940)
38 MicH. L. REv. 632. The General Electric case, cited by the Court fFederal'Radio
Comm. v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 50 Sup. Ct. 389 (1929)1, held that no ap-
peal lay from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to the Supreme Court, on
the ground that the Court of Appeals was not acting judiciously in reviewing actions
taken by the Federal Radio Commission inasmuch as that court could take new evidence
and make new findings of fact.
5347 U. S. C. § 310 (b) : "The station license required hereby, the frequencies author-
ized to be used by the licensee, and the rights therein granted shall not be transferred,
assigned, or in any manner either voluntarily or involuntarily disposed of, or indirectly by
transfer of control of any corporation holding such license, to any person, unless the
Commission shall, after securing full information, decide that said transfer is in the
public interest, and shall give its consent in writing."54See, e.g., 47 U. S. C. § 401, which provides that the FCC may petition the Attorney
General to bring mandamus proceedings against violators of the Act, in the federal district
courts.
5547 U. S. C. § 312 (a.).
50The Greater Kampeska Radio Corp. v. FCC, 108 F. (2d) 5 (App. D. C. 1939), (1940)
11 Am L. REv. 204; Trinity Methodist Church South v. FCC, 62 F. (2d) 850 (App. D. C.
1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 599, 53 Sup. Ct. 317 (1932). See also Boston Broadcasting
Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 67 F. (2d) 505 (App. D. C. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S.
1942]
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B. Control of Business Practices
1. Regidations for monopoly co.nrol.-Whence, then, comes the problem
concerning the jurisdiction' of the Commission? It arises primarily from the
fact that the regulations in question were promulgated to curb monopoly and
to prevent contracts in restraint of trade. The wails of the networks are
predicated on this phase of the situation and on the alleged non-applicability
of Section 311 of the Act,5 7 which provides:
"The Commission is hereby directed to refuse a station license .. .
to any person . . . whose license has been revoked by a court under
section 313, and is hereby authorized to refuse such station license ...
to any other person . . . which has been finally adjudged guilty by a
Federal court of unlawfully monopolizing or attempting to monopolize,
radio communication, directly or indirectly . . . or to have been using
unfair methods of competition."
Section 313 expressly makes all anti-trust laws applicable to the Act, and
Section 314 provides for the preservation of competition in the industry.
But despite all these provisions manifesting the intention of Congress that
radio should not become non-competitive, it is reasonably clear that Congress
did not intend that the Commission should be empowered directly to enforce
the anti-trust laws. If the words of Section 311 do not make that clear, the
history of the passage of the Radio Act of 1927 makes it abundantly plain
that Congress intended to leave the prosecution of violations of the Sherman
Act to the departments of government primarily charged with their enforce-
ment, and that the Commission should act thereon only after a court con-
viction. The then Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, withheld his
approval of the original act until the equivalent of the present Section 313
so provided.
5 8
Whether the FCC may validly oppose the monopolistic characteristics of
the networks bids fair to become a moot question in this specific case in
view of the anti-trust actions filed by the Department of Justice against CBS
and NBC on the last day of 1941."9 Prepared last summer, the suits had
been pigeonholed while the Commission and the networks attempted to reach
an understanding.60 Unofficial opinion was that the entering of the suits was
"an almost inadvertent piece of routine," possibly "a case of mixed signals."
679, 54 Sup. Ct. 103 (1933) ; Campbell v. Gelano Chem. Co., 281 U. S. 599, 50 Sup. Ct. 412
(1930).57See Briefs and Supplemental Briefs for Columbia Broadcasting System and National
Broadcasting Company before the FCC in Matter of the Investigation of Chain, and
Network Broadcasting, Monopoly in. the Broadcasting Industry and Related Matters,
and the statements submitted to the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee in the hear-
ings on S. Res. 113. Immediately upon the publication of the regulations, CBS and NBC
launched a pamphleteering campaign, during which several booklets designed for the lay
reader were distributed.5s8See remarks of Senator White, draftsman of the original Radio Act of 1927, in
colloquy with Chairman Fly of the FCC, Hearings on S. Res..113, pp. 78-82.5 9Tma MAG. vol. 39, no. 2, p. 50 (Jan. 12, 1942).
6OContaining all the'points made in the FCC "monopoly" report in the spring of 1941,
the suits are not entirely accurate because of changes made by the networks during the
controversy with the FCC.
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Aside from the question of relevance of the anti-trust laws in the broadcasting
tekt, any possible success for the networks in the FCC controversy would
not materially relieve the precariousness of their position.61
2. Regulations which go beyond monopoly control.-But a broader state-
ment of the network contention is that the Communications Act did not confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to regulate the business practices of the broad-
casters, but merely to license them. And, it is urged, as these regulations do
attempt to regulate business practices by prohibiting certain contracts on
penalty of refusal of licenses, the Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction
in this regard. Thus stated, the issue takes on larger importance and there-
fore merits our further attention.
The main support for the contention is found in language of the Supreme
Court in the recent case of Federal Communicatioans Commission v. Sanders
Brothers Radio Station.6 2 The question there was whether the Commission
must take into consideration, when licensing another station in the same area,
the economic consequences on an already licensed station. The Court upheld
the Commission's contention that such fact alone neither authorized nor
compelled the Commission to refuse the second application, though it might
be weighed with other considerations of public convenience, interest, or
necessity. Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking arguendo, directed his remarks to
the proposition that the Commission owed no duty to the respondent station
to protect it from adverse economic effects of competition, and went on to say:
"But the Act does not essay to regulate the business of the licensee.
The Commission is given no supervisory control of the programs, of
business management or of policy. In short, the broadcasting field is
open to anyone, provided there be an available frequency over which
he can broadcast without interference to others, if he shows his compe-
tency, the adequacy of his equipment, and financial ability to make good
use of the assigned channel.
"Plainly it is not the purpose of the Act to protect a licensee against
competition but to protect the public." 63
Those using the first portion of the quotation do not go on to explain the
context. Yet although that quotation is at most dictum, it is a correct expo-
sition of the interpretation placed upon the entire Act by Senator White,
who was one of the drafters of the original legislation. In Senator White's
revision of the Act of 1934, which is now before the Congress,6 4 the quotation
above is incorporated as an amendment to Section 326. Concerning the
amendment, the Senator writes:
6 1Further grief may be in prospect for NBC, because Mutual has filed suit against
NBC in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for triple damages
under the Sherman Act. If the government's 'anti-trust suit is successful, NBC will be
hard put to defend against the Mutual suit. TIME MAG., vol. 39, no. 3, p. 75 (Jan. 19,
1942).
62309 U. S. 470, 60 Sup. Ct. 693 (1940), 11 AmR L. REv. 177, 8 GEo. WAsr. L. REv.
1106, 26 WAsH. U. L. Q. 121.
63309 U. S. jt 475.
64S. 1806, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced July 31, 1941.
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"Notwithstanding this pronouncement of the Supreme Court, not-
withstanding the fact that no language can be found in the Act which
confers any right upon the Commission to concern itself with the busi-
ness phases of the operation of radio broadcast stations and notwith-
standing the further fact that Section 3 (h) of the Act provides that a
person engaged in radio broadcasting should not be regarded as a
common carrier, the Commission has nevertheless concerned itself more
and more with such matters. The charge is made that the Commission
is attempting to control both the character and source of program
material and the contractual and other arrangements made by the
licensee for the acquisition of such material.
"The amendment spells out in black and white what it is believed
was not only the original intention of Congress but is its present inten-
tion, with respect to this subject, in the hope that confusion and contro-
versy can be eliminated. The amendment preserves the prohibition now
contained in the Act against interference with the right of free speech
and that against utterance of obscene, indecent or profane language by
means of radio communication."6 5
With due respect for those urging that the chain broadcasting regulations
represent an assertion of control over the business management of licensees,
it is submitted that the regulations do not so operate. It is true that the
Commission is attempting to rid the industry of tying affiliation contracts,
but that is not affirmative control of management. Inasmuch as no affirmative
control is asserted and these regulations are within the letter and the spirit
of Section 310 (b), the argument-against their validity on this score does not
impress.66
B. Program Control
The second point made by Senator White raises the final problem of juris-
diction. The regulations were promulgated to improve programs offered to
the public and to free the licensee from the contractual inhibitions against
the exercise of his own discretion in program selection. The alternative basis
for the validity of the regulations, then, is stated to be the policy against
permitting the licensee to fetter or transfer that discretion. But inasmuch as
the regulations affect programs, they touch freedom of speech. The problem
thereby raised is distinctly different from those discussed earlier. It is the
problem of censorship.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:
65This language was employed by Senator White in the explanatory material which
accompanied his bill when it was introduced in the Senate. A close reading of Hearings
on S. Res. 113 indicates that Senator White is held in high esteem by his colleagues as
one %vell qualified to write radio legislation; but one cannot but be impressed by the fact
that other members of the Committee were apparently in accord with the FCC's inter-
pretation of the Act.6 6See generally Note, FCC Regulation of Competition Among Radio Networks (1942)
51 YALE L. J. 448; Miller, Legal Aspects of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations (1941)
12 Am L. Rlv. 293; (1941) 12 Am L. REv. 301. The latter note presents both sides of
the argument on the question of the Commission's jurisdiction.
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"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press ... "
While the founding fathers could not, of course, have had radio in mind
when this provision was framed, and although radio broadcasting has not
been handled as gently in any other country,67 Congress, when it enacted the
Communications Act, expressly provided that it should not tontravene the
First Amendment:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall pe promulgated or fixed by the Commission whiclf shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communication. No
person within the jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any ob-
scene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication."6 8
By this provision the Commission is stripped of all control over programs
offered by broadcasters. The Act prescribes certain minimum standards to
the broadcaster in relation to what he cannot broadcast,6 and provides af-
firmatively that if he allows time to one candidate for public office he must
allow an equal amount to that candidate's opponents.70 No power of cen-
sorship is given the licensee. Yet the Commission is to regulate in the public
convenience, interest, or necessity, and the licensee is to broadcast under the
same standard.
If the broadcaster has no power of censorship and the Commission has
neither control over program material nor power to prevent the licensee's
entering into contracts which give to persons beyond regulation by the fed-
eral government the power to determine what will be broadcast, who, then,
will determine what programs are conducive to the "public convenience,
interest, or necessity"?
The Constitution of the United States, and that of each of the states of the
Union, provides that "freedom of the press" shall not be impaired. Just what
is "freedom of the press"? What does the concept involve? Freedom is
given by constitutional franchise not without some purpose. What is the
purpose for which the press is left "free"?
Chancellor Kent, in the celebrated case of People v. Croswell,7 discussed the
reasons for the constitutional freedom of the "fourth estate" in the following
words:
"The first American congress, in 1774, in one of their public addresses,
(Journals, vol. 1, p. 57,) enumerated five invaluable rights, without which
67See Brown, The Constitutional Law and History of Broadcasting in Great Britain
(1937) 8 Am L. REv. 177.
6847 U. S. C. § 326. See 67 CONG. REc. 5480 (1934).
6947 U. S. C. § 316 prohibits material concerning lotteries; § 317 provides that advertis-
ing must be announced as such. See also the provisions of § 326.
7047 U. S. C. § 315.
713 Johns. 336 (N. Y. 1804). This was the famous libel suit against Croswell for
items published in The Wasp concerning President Jefferson, the primary question being
whether truth was a defense to an action for libel on the government.
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a people cannot be free and happy... One of these rights was the free-
do"; of the press, and the importance of this right consisted, as they ob-
served, 'besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in
general in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of gov-
ernment, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its
consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive offi-
cers are shamed or intimidated into more honorable and just modes of
conducting affairs.'
* * *<
"I am far from intending that these authorities mean, by freedom of
the press, a press wholly beyond the reach of the law, for that would be
emphatically Pandora's Boxr, the source of every evil."7 2
Times have changed since Chancellor Kent wrote these words. The
pamphleteer has been replaced by powerful newspapers and chains of news-
papers. Has the purpose for which the press is free likewise changed? The
Wall Street Journal in 1925 gave the version of the concept that has been
announced again and again by American editors:
"A newspaper is a private enterprise, owing nothing whatever to the
public, which grants it no franchise. It is therefore 'affected' with no
public interest. It is emphatically the property of its owner who is selling
a manufactured product at his own risk. . .."73
The radio broadcasting industry today is a component part of the nation's
press. It differs from the newspaper press only in that it is dependent on the
federal franchise for its operation. Just as certainly as there is censorship in
newspaper editing, there is censorship in radio broadcasting; and in addition,
there always remains the possibility that additional censorship may be exer-
cised by the Federal Communications Commission. In the publication of a
newspaper the editor makes the decisions that determine what shall and what
shall not be printed. The process is called "editing," but its effect is censor-
ship. When many newspapers are combined in a chain, a single editor at a
central office may decide what shall or shall not be printed in all the papers.
This too is called "editing." But if a public official took the place of the
central editor and made the same determinations, his action would be con-
sidered and labeled "censorship." So far as the reading public is concerned,
the effect is the same.
As a practical matter such central editing in the newspaper field is almost
impossible for technical reasons. But it is distinctly possible in the radio in-
dustry and in the case of network programs is actually the process employed.
The only discretion left to the licensee is whether to switch the network pro-
gram on for broadcast; and if he fails to broadcast, he subjects himself to a
723 Johns. at 390, 392. See HALE AND BENSON, LAw OF THE PRESS (2d ed. 1933).
73Jan. 20, 1925, p. 8. On January 16, 1939, publisher Frank Gannett and Secretary of
Interior Ickes engaged in a radio debate on the topic "Do We Have a Free Press." See
Towr MEETING BULL., vol. 4, no. 10 (Jan. 16, 1939). The editorial discussion of this
affair during the ensuing weeks brought forth repeated assertions of the sentiments ex-
pressed by the Tournal, supra.
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loss of revenue. Thus it appears that the networks have rather complete
control of what the American radio audience will hear. As long as the
present limited number of stations is available and the exclusive features of
the affiliation contracts remain effective, this control apparently will remain
vested in CBS, NBC, and to a limited extent in Mutual Broadcasting Company.
It should be pointed out that thus far no serious complaint has been regis-
tered concerning the manner in which the networks have exercised this control.
Their programs have been of generally high calibre. But the danger of
vesting this control in the hands of a few is obvious; and that danger is not
lessened by the fact that the few is comprised of a group not "the government."
On the other hand, the difficulties facing the individual broadcaster who has
no network affiliation as a source of worthwhile material are serious. The
listening public has been remarkably well educated to artistry; and, it is
claimed, networks are required to provide the necessary talent to all parts of
the country. So the program choice of the unaffiliated broadcaster is of
little benefit to the public. But there are those who believe talent is available
in other places beside New York, Chicago, and Hollywood, and that an altered
radio industry would draw out that talent. An example is Denver's Rocky
Mountain Radio Council, a co-operative organization of regional stations and
colleges, which was recently honored by the trade journal Variety for progress
toward "freeing the local station from its inert attitude of reliance on either
network programs or transcriptions. .... T1
It may be argued that the FCC has a control (i.e., censorship) over program
material comparable to that which it objects to in the hands of the networks.
Program control by means of the power of life and death over the technical
existence of the licensee is analogous to that by means of termination of
network affiliation. In the abstract, not only is that kind of control legitimate
and of the type contemplated by the authority creating the Commission, but
further, it is not within the statutory prohibition against censorship by the
Commission. The requirement that the Commission make regulations in the
public convenience, interest, and necessity implies a degree of control over what
is broadcast, regardless of the language of Section 326. Only if the FCC's
power in this regard is diverted into illegitimate channels should it be decried.
The present practice of exercising its power in renewal proceedings, however,
instead of by hearings as provided for in revocation cases is not salutary and
is conducive to suspicion.
But the present regulations do not necessarily hold the solution to the
problem under discussion. Studies by the FCC show that stations affiliated
with newspapers sell nearly half the total time sold on the nation's stations.75
With chain control broken, there might arise in its place local monopolies,
created by the newspaper-radio tie-up, of these two important media of com-
munication-a situation hardly preferable to the present one.
74Tnm MAG., vol. 38, no. 26, p. 36 (Dec. 29, 1941).
75Newspaper affiliated stations sold in 1940 42% of the total time and received therefor
45.8% of the total broadcast service income of all outlets, excluding 31 network managed
and operated stations. Source: table prepared by FCC from 1940 reports to the Com-
mission by licensees of standard broadcast stations.
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III. RADIO: PUBLIC UTILITY?
Radio has come of age; it is now big business. With receiving sets in
almost every home and automobile, radio is acutely affected with the public
interest and thus must be subject to the public will. Regulation is not new
in the field. As Mark Ethridge has said: "Here is an industry that was born
of regulation. The government was its midwife; ... .,76
The question facing radio and the people, then, is what organizational
method is most in the public interest. This is quite apart from the possible
invalidity of the impending Commission rulings or the outcome of the anti-
trust proceedings. The loss of either controversy will result in the same
situation for the networks.
It is submitted that to the presently proposed correctives a public utility
status for tadio is to be preferred.77
The problems which have prompted governmental action stem in large part
from the "bottleneck" situation-the inequality of opportunity occasioned by
a station shortage in certain metropolitan areas. Of three possible solutions,
i.e., fewer networks, more stations, or non-exclusive network affiliations, the
FCC has seized upon the third. It would appear, however, that the technical
advancements being made in the broadcasting science render such solution-
if solution it be--only temporary. Most pertinent of these changes is the
development of frequency modulation broadcasting which is destined to sup-
plant present methods. 77* FM gives greater fidelity and less interference
than AM (amplitude modulation), now in general use. Allocation of AM
stations has a technical limit which has been reached under standard methods
of transmission. But with frequency modulation, stations can be operated on
the same frequency with much less mileage separation than is possible with
amplitude modulation, since FM excludes all but the strongest signal.
78
Through increased distribution of new sets capable of receiving FM broad-
casts, it is rapidly becoming economically feasible to have many more outlets
in every community, with the following implications:
76See address of Mr. Ethridge before 19th Annual Convention of Nat'l Ass'n of Broad-
* casters, St. Louis, Mo., May 14, 1941, entitled "A Fair Deal for Radio."77Quite evidently Congress has the power to denominate radio a public utility if it so
* desires. See note 36 supra and text thereto. See also Heinl, Is a Broadcasting Station
a Public Utility? (1930) 6 P. U. FORT. 344, 345, where Judge Ira Robinson, formerly
chairman of the Federal Radio Commission, says: "Whether you look at it from the
listening end or the transmitting end, it is concededly a public utility." And as regards
the position of the networks on the question, Judge Robinson says: "It seems that every
time the broadcasters have a meeting, they resolve that their stations are not public
utilities. The wish is merely father to the thought." Cf. (1938) 23 CORNELL L. Q. 491. A
similar view is attributed to former FCC Chairman McNinch, in Bratter, Radio Power
and Air-Channel Regulatory Headaches (1939) 23 P. U. FORT. 643, 644. "Like a public
utility, a broadcasting enterprise is a licensed monopoly on a given frequency and in a
given area, in return for which license the enterprise submits to government regulation."
Id. at 644, 645.
"" It is true-that Section 3 (h) of the Communications Act of 1934 [47 U. S. C. § 153 (h)]
provides that a broadcaster is not a common carrier (with stated exceptions) ; but many
public utilities are not common carriers: e.g., electric light and power plants. It does not
follow from the fact that a service is a public utility 'that is also a common carrier.771See note 78 in!ra.78See comment on FCC action in allocating a portion of the radio spectrum to FM
broadcasting (May 20, 1940) in (1940) 11 Am L. REv. 316. See also TIME MAG., vol 38,
no. 23, p. 48 (Dec. 8, 1941).
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With four or five stations in every metropolitan area, 79 each free of ex-
clusivity obligations, the four existing networks would always have an outlet
available. If profitable, another network or two could be developed.79 The
network in this projected situation would serve primarily.as an advertising
agency with programs for sale to advertisers. Sustaining programs which the
station needs to comply with the requirement of programs in the public interest
would be produced by the network and sold to individual stations. A more
extensive use of transcribed programs would likewise aid the fulfilling of that
requirement. The federal government, through the appropriate body, 0 would
regulate rates as between the network and the individual station, but not
between the network and the advertiser.81
Classification as a public utility does not necessarily imply monopoly.
Indeed, a public utility status implies control in the public interest; and if it
appears that the public interest requires a form of regulated competition
which may best be accomplished through treatment as a utility, then that status
is desirable.8 2 Here, it would be in the public interest to have a type of
controlled competition which will insure a sufficient number of stations to
provide each national network (limited in number by economic considerations)
with a local outlet. Neither must a public utility be a distributor to the ulti-
mate consumer; it may be a producer or intermediate dealer.83 Applied to
79Present FM transmission does not carry long distances; rural areas might thus be
deprived of radio service unless arrangements are made for transmitters to be placed in
non-metropolitan areas also. The evident commercial difficulties are not insuperable. See
note 78 supra.
70,Chairman Fly believes the optimum number is six. See his testimony in Hearings
on S. Res. 113.
80Logically, the present or a reconstituted FCC.
z 81See note 83 istfra.V 82 See Note (1920) 33 HAuv. L. REv. 576, which clearly demonstrates that regulated
monopoly and regulated competition differ only in degree, not in kind. A public utility
may be either, depending on the public convenience, interest, and necessity at any particular
time.83See e.g., the electric power industry, where there are producers, intermediate dealers
(wholesalers), and retailers (local utility companies). Each of these may be classed as a
public utility, even though only the last sells to the ultimate consumer. See City of
St. Louis v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 97 F. (2d) 726, 730 (C. C. A. 8th 1938):
. . . [If a corporation is chartered as a public utility .... it may be held to be a
distributor of either gas or electricity for public use even though it engages in wholesale
and not retail distribution. [Citing North Carolina Pub. Serv. Co. v. Southern Power
Co., 282 Fed. 837 (C. C. A. 4th 1922), cert. denied, 263 U. S. 508, 44 Sup. Ct. 164 (1924) ;
Salisbury & Spencer Ry. v. Southern Power Co., 79 N. C. 18, 101 S. E. 593 (1919).]"
Accord: Main Realty Co. v. Blackstone Valley Gas & Elec. Co., 59 R. I. 29, 193 Atl. 879
(1937), (1938) 112 A. L. R. 744, 773.
The coming importance of the process of transmission of energy by radio is pertinent
to the need for classification as a public utility, because power for industrial and domestic
use so transmitted would more than ever affect radio with the public interest. The Com-
munications Act of 1934 anticipates such development. Section 2 (a) of the Act provides:
"The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication
by wire or radio and all interstate and foreign transmission of energy by radio .
(Italics added.)
Under the plan herein envisioned, the "public" of the radio utility would be the broad-
casting stations; hence regulation of rates as to stations and not as to advertisers. See
text to note 81 supra. Cf. Editorial (1937) 19 P. U. FoRT. 509, as an example of the
common misconception that the "public" here involved is the listening audience, which
leads to statements that radio is not conceived of as a public utility because the service
is free.
1942]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
radio, these considerations point to the feasibility of placing the broadcasting
industry in the utility category.
Much of the "freedom of the press" argument could be avoided by leaving
the news reporting function to the Associated Press, the United Press, and the
International News Service, to which the chains would sell time.sa3 And a
system of equal grants of time for political candidates and controversial subjects
would eliminate any question as to the fairness or propriety of a "public
forum."
A more effective mode of regulating advertising is sorely needed, for much
sales patter on the air today could never appear on the label of the article being
advertised, first, because print would reveal its twaddlish character, and second,
because it might even be illegal. The Federal Trade Commission has a special
board which examines alleged misrepresentations or fraud in advertising by
radio; but its method has been only that of seeking the co-operation of the
radio medium and of the suspected advertiser.8 4 Positive regulation of ad-
vertising by air in the public interest, convenience, and necessity (all three!)
would no more be an abridgment of freedom of the press than is a similar
control over newspaper advertising of and labels on mercantile goods and the
like. 5
The traditional concept of radio as an advertising business in its own right
is being questioned by a type of broadcasting following close on the heels of
FM development. A station transmits with its program a "pig squeal" which
can be eliminated only by the use of a special receiving set which the station
leases to its "subscribers." 8 6 Program service is then unimpaired by "soap
operas," "scare advertising," or pure puff. It seems unlikely, however, that
such a plan can substantially replace the present methods of securing revenues.
This is true particularly since the listener does not at present directly bear the
cost of producing programs; and advertising funds would be poured into other
channels by advertisers, thus resulting in no saving to the consumer.
There appears no immediate reason why all the above considerations are
not applicable to television as and when it finds its place in the commercial
picture.8 7
While the approach taken by the Communications Commission may furnish
at present the only possible answer to the problems, and while it may represent
improvement over the former laissez-faire attitude, it seems destined to become
outmoded as rapidly as technical developments make possible a more nearly
satisfactory service to the American public through the controlled multiplica-
tion of local stations. Then, and only then, will the FCC ideal of orderly
competition8s be realized. Stanley M. Brown.
John Wesley Reed
83
'See Shapiro, The Press, the Radio and the Law (1935) 6 Am L. REv. 128.
S4jONES, LAW OF JOURNALISM (1940) 309.
85The chains have self-administered limits upon the amount of advertising in any net-
work program; but this does not affect contents.86See Note (1941) 12 AIR L. R, v. 299.87See Editorial, Television As the Utility of the Future (1937) 20 P. U. FORT. 239.
88Although the Commission appears to favor "free" competition, in reality it is pro-
posing limited competition. See Comment, FCC Regulation of Competition Among Radio
Networks (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 448, 463.
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